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The strategies adopted by individuals to select relevant information to pass on are central to un-
derstanding problem solving by groups. Here we use agent-based simulations to revisit a cooperative
problem-solving scenario where the task is to find the common card in decks distributed to the group
members. The agents can display only a sample of their cards and we explore different strategies to
select those samples based on the confidences assigned to the cards. An agent’s confidence that a
particular card is the correct one is given by the number of times it observed that card in the decks
of the other agents. We use a Gibbs distribution to select the card samples with the temperature
measuring the strength of a noise that prevents the agents to correctly rank the cards. The group
is guaranteed to find the common card in all runs solely in the infinite temperature limit, where the
cards are sampled regardless of their confidences. In this case, we obtain the scaling form of the time
constant that characterizes the asymptotic exponential decay of the failure probability. For finite
time, however, a finite temperature yields a probability of failure that is several orders of magnitude
lower than in the infinite temperature limit. The available experimental results are consistent with
the decision-making model for finite temperature only.
I. INTRODUCTION
A central goal of the study of psychologically-inspired
problem-solving systems is the understanding and mod-
eling of the human mental processes of decision making
[1, 2]. A second, not less important goal, is the evaluation
and proposal of strategies to improve the quality of those
decisions. Accordingly, in this paper we revisit and gen-
eralize a cooperative problem-solving scenario introduced
by Leavitt in the early 1950s [3] (see also [4]), aiming at
finding the decision-making strategies that optimize the
performance of the group.
In Leavitt’s problem-solving scenario, each of N sub-
jects is dealt a deck of N cards selected from a master set
of N + 1 cards. The setup is such that each card appears
on N − 1 decks, except for one card that appears on all
N decks. The group’s task is to find the common card in
the shortest time possible [3]. The original experiments
employed N = 5 subjects who were placed on cubicles
that allowed the realization of a variety of communica-
tion patterns. Actually, this setup was originally devised
and subsequently widely used to study the effects of the
communication patterns on group performance [5–8] (see
[9, 10] for more recent contributions in this line). The
subjects communicated by writing messages that could
be passed through slots in the walls of the cubicles. The
task was considered finished when each agent indicated
the common card by throwing an appropriate switch.
The nature of Leavitt’s task contrasts with the prob-
lems usually posed to cooperative problem-solving sys-
tems, which can also be solved by a single agent or by
agents working independently of each other [11–15]. In
fact, cooperation among the members of the group is
mandatory to find the common card in the decks. In
particular, the typical behavior of a subject in working
toward a solution was to show all its cards to the members
of the group with whom it was allowed to communicate,
who then used that information to update their confi-
dences about which card of their decks was the common
card [3].
Rather than focusing on small groups of human sub-
jects as in the seminal works of the 1950s, here we con-
sider extensive agent-based simulations aiming at offer-
ing a complete perspective on the group performance for
general N . In time, we assume that the group’s choice
of the common card is determined by the majority rule
with eventual ties broken randomly, and that the group
performance is measured by the failure probability, i.e.,
the probability the group chooses a wrong card.
In addition, we make Leavitt’s task more difficult, as
well as more interesting from the perspective of decision
making, by limiting to C ≤ N the number of cards the
agents (i.e., our virtual subjects) can display and by ask-
ing the group to make a decision at any time τ . The
important feature is that now the agents must also de-
cide which cards to show to the other members of the
group. Here we consider two possibilities: the agents
simply sample C cards at random from their decks or
they pick the sample they estimate is the most likely to
contain the correct card. Of course, an agent’s confidence
that a particular card is the correct one is determined by
the number of times it observed that card in the decks of
the other agents. These two possibilities can be viewed
as extremes of a Gibbs probability distribution where the
temperature T , which must be interpreted simply as a
noise parameter, measures the strength of a random per-
turbation that prevents the agents to rank correctly the
cards according to their confidences.
Since our interest here is on the evaluation of decision-
making strategies rather than on the effects of commu-
nication patterns, we assume that an agent can, in prin-
ciple, interact with any other member of the group, so
that we select the pairs of interacting agents at random
among the members of the group. Somewhat surpris-
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2ingly, we find that the zero-temperature, noiseless limit,
in which the agents display only their highest confidence
cards, yields an extremely poor performance for any time
τ . In addition, we find that in the asymptotic time limit
only the infinite temperature limit, in which the cards
are displayed without regard to their confidences, guar-
antees that the correct card is found in all experiments.
In this case, we find that the probability of failure de-
creases exponentially with increasing time and that the
time constant τc scales with N
3/2 for C < N and with
N for C = N . For a fixed time τ , however, intermedi-
ate values of the temperature yield a performance several
orders of magnitude superior to the performances of the
two temperature extremes. This surprising result reveals
the importance of the agent’s decision-making strategies
to the optimization of group performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II we describe our generalization of Leavitt’s task
and the rules that govern the behavior of the agents in
their attempts to complete the task. In Section III we
present and analyze the results of the agent-based simu-
lations, emphasizing the two extreme cases where the dis-
played cards are drawn randomly without regard to their
confidences (T → ∞) and where they are chosen deter-
ministically according to their confidence ranks (T = 0).
Finally, in Section IV we summarize our main findings
and compare them with the experimental results.
II. MODEL
We consider N card decks where each deck contains N
distinct cards. The cards of a deck are selected from a
collection of N + 1 distinct cards, so that there is only
one card that is common to all decks and any two decks
have exactly N − 1 cards in common. These decks are
distributed to a group of N agents (one deck for each
agent) and the task of the group is to find the unique card
that appears in all decks. The agents must achieve that
by exchanging information about their card decks and
formulating a strategy to decide each of their N cards is
the common one. Next we describe the interaction and
decision-making processes.
Each agent i = 1, . . . , N assigns a confidence value
to each card αi = 1, . . . , N in its deck, denoted by the
integer variable F τiαi = 0, 1, . . . , τ , where τ stands for
the number of interaction rounds or, more simply, the
time. This quantity measures the confidence of agent
i that card αi is the common card in the decks. The
card labels have a subscript signaling the deck (or the
agent) they belong to, since the decks do not have the
same cards and there is no point for an agent to assign a
confidence value to a card that is not in its deck as that
card surely is not the card common to all decks. Hence,
when agent i is prompted to answer which card is the
common one at time τ , it selects the card that maximizes
the confidences F τiαi . In case of a draw, a card is selected
at random among the tied cards. Initially all cards have
the same confidence values, viz., F 0iαi = 0 for all i and
αi. The effect of the interaction between agents is then
to change these confidences, as we describe next.
We impose no restrictions on the communication be-
tween agents so, in principle, an agent can interact with
all its N − 1 peers in the group. More pointedly, at time
τ we choose randomly two distinct agents in the group.
The first agent - the observer - assesses C cards of the
second agent - the observed - and updates its confidences
by adding one unit of confidence to the cards they have
in common. An interaction round is complete when this
procedure is repeated N times, so that N , not necessar-
ily distinct, agents have updated their confidences. (We
note that only the observers update their confidences.)
Then the time counter is incremented by one unit, i.e,
τ → τ + 1.
Since it is the observed agent that selects the C cards
that are assessed by the observer, we need to set up
strategies for selecting those cards. The most natural
strategy is simply to sample C cards without replace-
ment from the deck of the observed agent. Another nat-
ural strategy is to choose the C cards with the highest
confidences. As already pointed out, these two strategies
can be seen as extremes of the temperature of a Gibbs
distribution as follows. We recall that there are
(
N
C
)
dif-
ferent samples of C cards that can be drawn from a deck
of N cards. Because each agent holds a different deck, we
denote those samples by Ckj with kj = 1, . . . ,
(
N
C
)
, where
j is the label of the agent. Then we associate an energy
value to each sample,
E
(Ckj) = − ∑
αj∈Ckj
F τjαj , (1)
which is minimized by the sample containing the cards
with the highest confidence values. Here we assume that
a sample Ckj is selected with probability
P (Ckj) = 1Zj exp [−βE (Ckj)] (2)
where Zj =
∑
Ckj exp
[−βE (Ckj)] is a normalization fac-
tor. The temperature T = 1/β ≥ 0 is interpreted as a
measure of a noise that prevents the observed agent to
select accurately the cards with the highest confidences.
This parameter allows us to interpolate between the ran-
dom sampling of cards (T →∞) and the selection of the
cards with the highest confidences (T = 0).
Our introduction of the sample size C = 1, 2, . . . , N is
justified when N is large and so it would take too long
for the observer to scan and record all cards in the hand
of the observed agent. In any event, here we view it as
an additional rule of the interaction between agents, i.e.,
that the observer can view only C cards of the deck of
the observed agent.
The decision of the group at time τ is obtained by
asking each agent i to designate its guess of the com-
mon card. As pointed out before, this is done by picking
3the card αi that maximizes the confidences F
τ
iαi
. The
group guess is then determined by the majority rule, i.e.,
the group picks the card designated by the majority of
the agents. As usual, in case of a draw, the decision is
made by selecting randomly one of the tied cards. Here
we measure the group performance by the failure proba-
bility Pτ , which is given by the fraction of independent
experiments that failed to find the common card at time
τ . We use the failure probability, rather than the success
probability 1− Pτ , because it is more convenient for the
purpose of quantifying its time asymptotic behavior in
the case of efficient decision strategies.
In sum, the group dynamics proceeds as follows. At
τ = 0 we assign the card decks to the agents and each
agent sets to zero the confidences of its cards. Next we
choose randomly the observer and the observed agent.
The observed agent evaluates the energy of each of the(
N
C
)
samples of C cards and picks a sample with a prob-
ability given by the Gibbs distribution (2). The observer
then updates the confidences of the cards that appear in
the sample selected by the observed agent (i.e., the cards
common to the sample and to the observer’s deck). The
time τ increases by one unit only after this procedure is
repeated N times.
III. RESULTS
The initial setup of the N card decks is deterministic,
i.e., all experiments begin with the same decks, as de-
scribed in Section II. The experiments have two sources
of stochasticity, viz., the choice of the pairs of interact-
ing agents and the sample of C cards scanned by the
observer. In the case C = N , stochasticity is due only
to the selection of the interacting agents. The results
presented here represent averages over 105 independent
runs. Next we discuss separately from the general case
the two temperature extremes of the Gibbs distribution
(2) as their study does not require the time-consuming
generation of the
(
N
C
)
cards samples.
A. Infinite temperature limit
Here we consider the case where the observed agent
randomly chooses a sample of C cards from its deck with-
out regard to their confidences, and offers them to the
observer for inspection. This corresponds to the limit
T = 1/β → ∞ of the Gibbs distribution (2). This in-
formation is then used to update the observer’s cards
confidences as discussed before. Figure 1 shows the de-
pendence of the probability of failure Pτ on the time τ
for fixed N in a semi-log plot. Except for small τ , this
probability exhibits a neat exponential decay character-
ized by the time constant τc = τc (N,C), which measures
the typical time the group requires to complete success-
fully the task. This figure shows that, as expected, τc
increases as the sample size C decreases and, more im-
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FIG. 1. Failure probability Pτ at time τ , for N = 10 and
(right to left) C = 1, 2, . . . , 10 in the infinite temperature
limit. The lines are the fittings Pτ = aN,C exp (−τ/τc) where
aN,C and τc = τc (N,C) are fitting parameters.
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FIG. 2. Semi-logarithm plot of the time constant τc as func-
tion of the ratio C/N for the infinite temperature limit and
N = 10, 15, 20, 25, 30 as indicated. The curve is the fitting
τc = 1.75 [1/ (C/N)− 1].
portantly, that given enough time the group is always
guaranteed to find the common card, i.e., Pτ → 0 for
τ →∞.
The dependence of the time constant τc on the param-
eters of the model is exhibited more clearly in Fig. 2,
which shows that the data for different N are described
very well by the scaling form
τc = N
3/2f (C/N) , (3)
with the scaling function f(x) = 1.75 (1/x− 1). In this
figure we use a semi-logarithm plot to highlight the good-
ness of fit in the region of C/N close to 1. We note that
in the case C = N , τc increases linearly with increas-
ing N as shown in Fig. 3. This result is consistent with
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FIG. 3. Dependence of the time constant τc on the group or
deck size N for C = N in the infinite temperature limit. The
symbols convention is the same as for Fig. 2. The straight
line is the fitting τc = −0.09 + 0.15N .
eq. (3) because f(1) = 0 and so this equation does not
determine the scaling of τc with N in the case C = N .
Interestingly, the uncertainty introduced by reducing the
amount of information the agents can transmit to each
other changes the scale of the time constant with the
group or deck size.
B. Zero temperature limit
Since in each interaction the observer inspects only C
cards of the deck of the observed agent, a natural strategy
to improve the performance of the group is to guarantee
that the latter displays the sample of cards that is the
most likely to contain the correct card. An apparently
sensible strategy is to choose the C cards with the highest
confidence values. This can be achieved by considering
the zero temperature T = 1/β → 0 limit of the Gibbs
distribution (2), but it is much more efficient simply to
rank the card confidences F τjαj ; αj = 1, . . . , N of the
observed agent j and select the top C cards. Eventual
draws between cards in and out this selection are broken
randomly, as usual.
We find that displaying the C cards with the high-
est confidences is actually disastrous since the probabil-
ity of failure rapidly tends to a nonzero limiting value
and becomes insensitive to increasing τ . (This point will
become clearer in the study of the finite temperature
case.) Accordingly, in Fig. 4 we show the asymptotic
failure probability P∞ for several deck sizes N . Extrap-
olation of these data to N →∞ yields the simple result
P∞ = 1− C/N , which offers a clue to the failure of this
noiseless strategy. In fact, there is the sporting chance
(N − C) /N = 1−C/N that the common card is not cho-
sen by an agent in the first round when the confidences
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FIG. 4. Asymptotic probability of failure P∞ as function
of the ratio C/N for the zero temperature limit and N =
10, 20, 40, 80, 160 as indicated. The solid curve is the function
P∞ = 1−C/N obtained by extrapolating the finite N results
to N →∞.
are equiprobable and the results indicate that for large N
this agent can strongly influence the other agents towards
a wrong decision.
C. Finite temperature
Here we consider the more general scheme that encom-
passes both strategies presented before, in which the C
cards shown to the observer are selected according to the
Gibbs distribution (2) using a finite and nonzero temper-
ature. The implementation of this case is more demand-
ing computationally as we need to calculate the proba-
bilities associated to all
(
N
C
)
samples of C cards that can
be drawn from the deck of the observed agent.
Figure 5, which shows the probability of failure Pτ as
function of the inverse temperature β at different times τ ,
reveals a few surprises. First, except for very short times
the noiseless strategy exhibits the worst performance, as
mentioned before. Second, for fixed τ there is a nonzero
value of β that minimizes the failure probability. For
instance, in Fig. 5 the failure probability for τ = 363 at
β = 0.01 is several orders of magnitude lower than at β =
0. Third and most surprisingly, the asymptotic failure
probability vanishes for β = 0 only. More pointedly,
we find P∞  exp (−b/β) where b is a parameter that
depends on N and C. This means that the value of β that
minimizes Pτ tends to zero as τ increases, a trend that is
already visible in the figure. We have verified that these
conclusions hold true for all values of the parameters N
and C < N .
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FIG. 5. Probability of failure Pτ as function of the inverse
temperature β for N = 10 and C = 5 for (top to bottom) τ =
43, 91, 144, 190, 229, 275, 301, 331, 363 and 104. In the limit
β →∞, we find P∞ = 0.287. The solid curve is the fitting of
the data for τ = 104, P104 = a exp (−b/β) where the fitting
parameters are a = 0.251 and b = 0.428.
IV. DISCUSSION
Understanding the influences on group performance is
a central issue in collective intelligence [16]. Most theo-
retical and experimental efforts have focused on the in-
fluence of the composition of the group, since this factor
can be more easily observed and controlled [17, 18]. Here
we focus instead on the strategies adopted by individuals
to select and transmit relevant information to the other
members of the group.
More pointedly, we revisit Leavitt’s cooperative
problem-solving scenario in which each member of a
group of size N receives a deck with N cards and its
task is to find the card that is common to all decks in
the shortest time [3, 4]. The decks are contrived so as to
maximize the difficulty of the task, e.g., any two decks
have N−1 cards in common and the cards come in N+1
types. Whereas the experiments carried out in the 1950s
employed N = 5 subjects in a variety of communication
patterns (i.e., who can communicate with whom), here
we use agent-based simulations to study the group perfor-
mance for general N in a fully connected communication
net. We ground our study on the persuasive assumption
that an agent’s confidence that a particular card is the
correct one is determined by the number of times it ob-
served that card in the decks of the other agents. In fact,
this strategy of increasing the card confidences follow-
ing the agent interactions is akin to the scheme used to
model lexicon acquisition in a cross-situational learning
scenario [19, 20]. In addition, we assume that the group
decision is determined by applying the majority rule to
the decisions of the group members.
In the case the agents can assess all cards of the decks
of the other members, we find that the scale of time to
complete successfully the task grows linearly with the
number of agents or decks, i.e., τc ∝ N (see Fig. 3). More
pointedly, we find that the probability of failure decreases
exponentially with increasing time, Pτ ∝ exp (−τ/τc).
This exponential decay is a consequence of the fact that
the interacting agents are chosen randomly, leading to
the possibility of uninformative repeated interactions or
of one or more agents never being selected for interaction
in a finite time τ .
The group task is made considerably more difficult
by limiting to C < N the number of cards that the
agents can show to each other. In fact, in the case the C
cards are sampled randomly without regard to their con-
fidences, the time constant becomes much greater than
in the unrestricted case C = N , namely, τc ∝ N3/2 (see
Fig. 2). An interesting consequence of restricting the
number of cards displayed is the need to specify a strat-
egy to select those cards. A natural line that we pursue
here is to link the chances of display of a card to its con-
fidence. We find that the exhibition of the cards with
the highest confidences yields a very poor performance
since it maximizes the failure probability for large τ (see
Fig. 5). The importance of the confidences on the selec-
tion of the displayed cards can be tuned by introducing
the Gibbs probability distribution (2), where the tem-
perature T = 1/β measures the strength of a noise that
prevents the correct ranking of the cards. Most inter-
estingly, for fixed τ we find that the failure probability
is minimized for a finite, nonzero temperature (see Fig.
5). However, in the asymptotic limit τ → ∞ it vanishes
only in the infinite temperature limit, i.e., in the case
the cards confidences do not affect their chances of being
selected for display.
Although the two temperature extremes of the Gibbs
distribution (2) are sensible strategies the subjects could
adopt in a real-world situation, the finite temperature
strategies are clearly too complex to be used in practice.
Of course, our intention of introducing the noise param-
eter or temperature was simply to add an element that
could prevent the correct ranking of the cards and, as
physicists, the Gibbs distribution came along naturally.
We expect, however, that a more psychologically realis-
tic implementation of this noise would produce similar
results.
Despite the simplicity of Leavitt’s task, it does not
yield to an analytical approach even in the infinite tem-
perature limit, where the card confidences play no role on
the decisions of the agents. In fact, a natural procedure
to tackle this problem analytically is to write recursion
equations for the probabilities that the card confidences
take on the (integer) values 0, . . . , τ at time τ [21]. The
difficulty is that the card confidences are not independent
random variables and so we need to work with the joint
probability distribution of the N card confidences, which
is impractical even for small N . Hence our Monte Carlo
approach is probably the simplest, if not the only, way
to study Leavitt’s task and its generalizations proposed
6TABLE I. Asymptotic mean number of runs with at least one
error in the case of N = 5 agents fixed at the corners of a
pentagon. The experimental result is η = 0.23 [3].
β = 0 β = 0.1 β = 0.3 β = 0.5 β →∞
C=1 0.998 0.251 0.503 0.527 0.601
C=2 0.997 0.058 0.201 0.267 0.387
C=3 0.996 0.004 0.149 0.302 0.549
C=4 0.997 0.001 0.092 0.198 0.565
C=5 0.997 0.999 0.997 0.996 0.997
here. Nevertheless, our use of scaling forms to analyze
the simulation results, which is perhaps the main contri-
bution of physics to the so-called science of complexity
[22], offered a thorough characterization of the problem.
To conclude, a comparison of our results with the sem-
inal experiments of Leavitt [3] is in order. As pointed
out, the experimental studies considered N = 5 subjects,
who were positioned at the corners of geometric patterns
(e.g., a pentagon). In addition, there were no restrictions
on the number of cards that could be displayed (i.e., C
was not fixed and could vary in time as well as from sub-
ject to subject). More importantly, Leavitt did not focus
on the group decision as we did here, but on the indi-
vidual subjects’ decisions. An unambiguous outcome of
Leavitt’s experiments is the mean number of experiments
with at least one error, which we denote by η. An error
occurs when a subject selects a wrong card. In the case
of a pentagon, Leavitt found η = 0.23. Our simulation
results for this scenario are exhibited in Table I where
we varied the sample size C and the inverse temperature
β. The results indicate that for any value of C < 5 it is
possible to find a value of β that reproduces the experi-
mental result, which, however, cannot be reproduced by
any of the temperature extremes. This finding highlights
the importance of (moderate) noise to model the human
mental processes of decision making.
The simplicity of Leavitt’s task and the prospect of
modeling the decision-making process of the individuals
is an enthralling research avenue that calls for more ex-
perimental results using, perhaps, digital platforms that
are not limited by the physical constraints of the experi-
ments carried out in the 1950s. We hope this contribution
will motivate further research on this direction.
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